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Introduction
The European automotive sector has been particularly and signi…cantly a¤ected by the most recent …nancial turmoil and the severe economic downturn. The sector has been hit by a sharp and uniform drop in demand for passenger cars. From 2000 until the …rst half of 2008, new passenger car registrations in Western Europe ranged from 14.2 to 14.8 million units on a yearly basis. In the second half of 2008 car registrations dropped dramatically, which led to a number of temporary plant closures and layo¤s, and to a low rate of capacity utilization. While car registrations temporarily stabilized at 13.7 million units in 2009, they dropped further to 13.0 million units in 2010.
1 At the same time, many automotive companies have reported problems with access to credit …nancing, in particular in getting loans on reasonable terms. In response to the …nancial and economic crisis, many European countries have introduced scrapping programs to foster car purchases, and thus cushion the impact of the sharp downturn on their domestic car production industry (see e.g. Car Communication (2009) 2 , IHS Global Insight (2010a) , IHS Global Insight (2010b) , ACEA (2010) for an overview). The schemes were most active in 2009, and they were also introduced in other parts of the world, e.g. the US Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS) of 2009 or so called "Cash for Clunkers" Program, or Japanese Eco-Friendly Vehicle Purchase Program of 2009. The concept of car scrapping schemes is simple: vehicle owners receive state money to trade in their old vehicles for new, usually more fuel-e¢ cient ones. The schemes'underlying rationale is also straightforward: for countries with signi…cant car production, a fall in demand for vehicles would raise the risk of bankruptcies and unemployment, thereby triggering severe consequences for workers in the car industry and for the industry's suppliers and distributors. Hence, for the major car-producing countries, the scrapping programs serve to promote car purchases to adjust strong pro-cyclical demand behaviour, and consequently to save production and jobs.
However, scrapping schemes are not new for the past crisis. They have also been widely used before the crisis, mainly aimed to reduce carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other emissions by taking older, more polluting cars o¤ the road, or to improve road safety by reducing the age of the car ‡eet on the roads and by selling new cars with better equipment (such as ABS, ESC, airbags and navigation systems). These environmental motives can especially be strong in the countries that have little or no domestic car production.
In this paper we study the impact of the scrapping schemes that were adopted during the recent economic crisis. Our …rst main question deals with the incentive e¤ects of the scrapping schemes. To which extent did the schemes stimulate total demand for cars, or at least did they serve to temporarily stabilize demand? And to which extent did the scrapping schemes also yield environmental bene…ts in the form of fuel economy savings on new purchased vehicles? Our second question is whether there were any crowding-out e¤ects of the scrapping schemes, such as substitution from non-eligible to eligible cars, or intertemporal substitution? Our third question is whether the scrapping schemes resulted in competitive and trade e¤ects: Did domestic …rms bene…t more than their foreign competitors, and did volume brands and small cars win at the expense of premium brands and large cars?
To address these questions we collected a unique dataset that enables us to combine the speci…c features of the European scrapping schemes with detailed data on car sales and product characteristics. We use monthly data for the period 2005-2011, and focus on nine European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. These countries make up for 90% of the car sales in the European Union. To estimate the impact of the scrapping schemes we follow a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, exploiting the fact that the speci…c timing of the scrapping schemes di¤ered between countries. We distinguish between targeted and non-targeted schemes. Targeted schemes provide a subsidy if the new car satis…es certain environmental eligibility criteria (mainly based on CO 2 emissions), and were adopted in for example France and Italy. Non-targeted schemes provide a subsidy regardless of the new car that is purchased. These were introduced in for example Germany and the United Kingdom.
Our empirical …ndings can be summarized as follows. First, scrapping schemes had a strong stabilizing impact on total car sales, especially in countries with targeted schemes: if there had been no schemes in 2009, total sales would have been 17.4% lower in the countries with targeted schemes, and they would have been 14.8% lower in countries with non-targeted schemes. In elasticity terms: a 1% point subsidy tends to raise car sales by 1.4% for cars under non-targeted schemes, and by 2.8% for eligible cars under targeted schemes. At the same time, the scrapping schemes only had a small e¤ect on the average fuel consumption of new purchased cars: without the schemes, average fuel consumption would have been 1.3% higher in countries with targeted schemes and 0.5% higher in countries with non-targeted schemes. That is, the main e¤ect of European scrapping schemes in the …nancial crisis was to temporarily stabilize total car sales, and their environmental bene…ts were very limited.
Second, there were only limited crowding out e¤ects. In the case of targeted schemes, the sales of non-eligible cars were not a¤ected during the period when the scheme is e¤ective. Furthermore, intertemporal substitution e¤ects were small. Third, the scrapping schemes had various competitive and trade e¤ects. Quite surprisingly, domestic car brands bene…ted more than foreign car brands from scrapping subsidies when the programs were non-targeted (as in Germany and the UK), but not when the programs were targeted (as in France and Italy). Premium brands gain less from subsidies than volume brands but only in the case of targeted schemes. Small cars (from the subcompact and compact segments) bene…t under both targeted and non-targeted schemes, whereas large cars (from the standard and luxury market segments) only bene…t under targeted schemes (i.e. when they meet the environmental eligibility criteria). The schemes may eventually impact trade ‡ows as, for instance, they may increase imports to satisfy the increased domestic demand for cars, not produced locally.
Our study is timely for two major reasons: (i) most empirical work on the incentive e¤ects of scrapping schemes has focused on non-crisis times, and has not compared the e¤ects on total car sales with the environmental bene…ts; (ii) no work has considered the competitive and trade e¤ects. We discuss both contributions in turn.
First, despite a number of theoretical and policy studies related to scrapping subsidies, 3 there are just a few studies that empirically investigate the economic e¤ects of scrapping schemes. Some authors apply a dynamic structural framework that enables them to di¤er-entiate between the short-term and long-term e¤ects of scrapping schemes on sales of new cars and to analyze the e¤ects of schemes on the used car market, for instance Adda and Cooper (2000) for French scrapping subsidies between 1994 and 1996 , or Schiraldi (2011 for Italian scrapping subsidies in 1997 and 1998. 4 While these papers focus on scrapping schemes in non-crisis times, only a few studies estimated the car demand e¤ects of schemes during the last …nancial and economic crisis. Mian and Su… (2012) and Li et al. (2013) apply a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to quantify the sales e¤ects of the US CARS program: Mian and Su… (2012) use variation across the US cities in ex-ante exposure to the program (based on the number of available clunkers), while Li et al. (2013) choose Canada as a control group for identi…cation. These US studies …nd positive short-term e¤ects of the program on car sales, but this e¤ect erodes if a longer time horizon is considered.
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3 Theoretical papers on the design of "cash-for-scrappage" subsidies are, for instance, Hahn (1995) , Alberini et al. (1995) , Esteban (2007) . Policy papers include the automotive consultancy IHS Global Insight (IHS Global Insight (2010a), IHS Global Insight (2010b)), which has analysed economic, environmental and road safety e¤ects of European scrapping schemes introduced in response to the last …nancial and economic crisis in the study for the European Commission. Several other policy studies concentrate on the environmental or safety impacts of scrapping schemes (e.g. OECD (1999) , OECD/ITF (2011)). 4 The authors …nd that the scrapping policies stimulate car sales in the short run, followed by a sales contraction in the long run. Licandro and Sampayo (2005) , using a hazard function approach and ignoring the second-hand market, …nd a high positive e¤ect of 1997 Spanish scrapping subsidy on sales in the short run, but small in the long run.
5 Cooper et al. (2010) and Copeland and Kahn (2012) estimate a time-series forecasting model to predict
With our study, we aim to contribute to this empirical literature on the economic e¤ects of scrapping programs, using a panel data approach and exploiting country-by-country program variation to identify the impact of scrapping policies (i.e. a country di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach). For this purpose, we exploit a unique monthly car model-level dataset, enriched with detailed data on the timing and design of the scrapping schemes, for a rich sample of nine European countries. This enables us to systematically compare the total sales e¤ects with the environmental bene…ts of the di¤erent types of schemes. Our study also …ts well into the more general empirical literature related to the ex post evaluation of competition policy, applied in the context of scrapping incentives in our paper. 6 Second, apart from the total sales e¤ects of scrapping programs and their impact on the demand for fuel-e¢ cient cars, we study their competitive and trade e¤ects in the light of the European Commission's policy towards scrapping subsidies. There is no noti…cation requirement for state aid and no formal assessment of scrapping schemes by the European Commission, although the Commission recognizes their possible adverse e¤ects on competition and trade. 7 In particular, the Commission requires that scrapping schemes are non-discriminatory with respect to the origin of a car. That is, the schemes should avoid favouring only the sale of vehicles of domestic manufacturers by including, for instance, car characteristics, which could discriminate against similar cars coming from other member states. Moreover, the schemes should be compatible with other parts of Community legislation, in particular concerning type-approval of vehicles (Euro IV emission limit values). Therefore, there is a noti…cation requirement for the conditions of schemes related to the technical characteristics of cars at draft stage. The Commission has the right to issue comments on the technical speci…cations where the …scal or …nancial incentives can potentially hinder trade in the internal market. However, no o¢ cial decision of the Commission is yet published.
counterfactual sales. Busse et al. (2012) study the price e¤ects of the US CARS Program and …nd evidence for considerable consumer bene…ts due to three reasons: 1) consumers bene…ted fully from the scrapping rebates, 2) consumers gained even more since the program stimulated car producers to increase their own rebates, 3) the program had little e¤ect on the prices in the used car market. Since we only observe list prices and not transaction prices, we cannot unfortunately quantify the price (pass-through) e¤ects of scrapping subsidies. 6 The di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach has become a standard method in the ex post evaluation of competition policy. Compared to most ex post merger studies (for instance, Ashenfelter et al. (2009), Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010) , Weinberg (2011) ), we use a country di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach rather than choose a control product group (i.e. products not a¤ected by the merger) in the same geographic market for identi…cation. Only a few studies rely on another geographic market as a control group (for instance, Hosken et al. (2011) ). Several papers use the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach also to investigate the impact of cash promotions, e.g. Busse et al. (2006) in the context of auto manufacturer promotions. 7 The Car Communication -Annex 3, "Guidance on Scrapping Schemes for Vehicles", summarizes the policy of the European Commission towards scrapping schemes.
Empirical evidence on the competitive and trade e¤ects of schemes is very scarce. For instance, IHS Global Insight (2010a) discuss the market structure e¤ects of "crisis"scrapping schemes and argue that market segments, including medium and large cars as well as premium and luxury vehicles, only marginally bene…ted from the schemes. OECD (1999) also report higher bene…ts of scrapping schemes for the producers of small cars at the expense of large cars. Li et al. (2013) argue that Japanese car producers Toyota, Honda and Nissan bene…ted much more from the targeted US CARS Program than other …rms. Overall, the program has not however led to any signi…cant shifts in market shares among car producers. As there is hardly any comprehensive analysis of competitive and trade e¤ects of schemes in the existing empirical studies, we aim to …ll in this gap in the literature. Generally, our rich empirical evaluation of scrapping subsidies' e¤ects follows the structure of economic compatibility assessment by the European Commission in the case of state aid (that balances its positive and negative e¤ects) that we implement in the context of scrapping incentives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the design and economic assessment of scrapping schemes related to our sample of European countries. Section 3 presents our empirical approach to the analysis of scrapping schemes. We …rst describe the data, and then depict our identi…cation and estimation strategy. In Section 4 we discuss our empirical …ndings. Conclusions follow in Section 5.
2 Design and economic assessment of scrapping schemes 2.1 De…nition and design of scrapping schemes Many European countries have introduced large-scale scrapping programs as an economic stimulus to increase market demand for the car sector during the last …nancial and economic crisis. 8 Scrapping schemes have been formulated in a variety of ways. Most of them are designed to take old (polluting) cars o¤ the road and to replace them typically with new, or younger (more fuel-e¢ cient) models. Such schemes are called "cash-for-replacement". 9 Only a few schemes in Europe are designed as "cash-for-scrappage", i.e. there is no condition on the age of a replacement car or obligation to purchase a replacement car at all. 10 For instance, the Greek scheme of 2009 was not conditioned on the purchase of a new car. Generally, scrapping schemes put di¤erent conditions on the duration of the program, the size of the incentive, the form of the incentive (tax rebates, price discounts, etc.), the age of an old vehicle that can be scrapped, and the conditions on a new vehicle that can be purchased. We discuss these features in more detail below.
Duration First, scrapping schemes di¤er in their duration, as shown in Figure 1 . Some countries introduce schemes that run for several years (e.g. Portugal), whereas other schemes have a short duration to temporarily stimulate demand (as, for instance, during the most recent economic crisis in Germany, the United Kingdom, etc.). Some countries phase out their scrapping schemes gradually (e.g. in France that gradually reduced the incentive size from EUR 1,000 in 2009 to EUR 750 in the …rst half of 2010 and to EUR 500 in the second half of 2010), while other countries end them abruptly (e.g. in Germany). The …gure depicts scrapping schemes in nine European countries based on IHS Global Insight, ACEA and various national sources. The o¢ cial duration of a scheme is given (i.e. not taking into account the extended period for registration, usually up to three months). Red color means that a scheme is "targeted". Green color means that a scheme is "non-targeted".
Size Furthermore, the scrapping schemes di¤er in their intensity as re ‡ected by the size of incentive and overall government budget available for a scheme, and subsequently, the maximum number of cars that can be purchased under the scheme (see Table 1 ). In 2009 the scrapping subsidies varied from EUR 1,000 (e.g. in France) to EUR 2,500 (in Germany).
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Incentives are usually …nanced by the government (either central or local), but car manufacturers may commit themselves to contribute to the incentive as well (e.g. 50:50 incentive in the United Kingdom). The German Government introduced the most generous scrapping program in 2009 (with an overall budget of EUR 5 billion).
12 11 The choice of optimal incentive size is far from obvious. For instance, Esteban (2007) argues that a subsidy lower than the price of a used car in the absence of subsidy can still induce scrappage. Alberini et al. (1995) argue that at low o¤er prices, vehicles that are in the poorest conditions, with relatively short remaining life are likely to be scrapped. At higher o¤er prices, vehicles in a better condition, with longer expected lives will be attracted under the scheme.
12 Usually scrapping schemes foresee a …xed budget and state the …nal date of a scheme, or specify that the scheme ends as soon as the budget expires. In the case of the former condition, there might be a spyke in sales in the last month(s) of the scheme. In the case of the latter condition, the program may have a stronger e¤ect on sales at the beginning (Li et al. (2013) The table summarizes scrapping schemes in nine European countries based on IHS Global Insight, ACEA and various national sources. We describe the characteristics of schemes that are the most relevant for our empirical analysis and that are related to passenger cars only. Spanish (2008 Spanish ( -2010 and British scrapping incentives include a mandatory incentive on the part of car manufacturers. The o¢ cial duration of a scheme is given (i.e. not taking into account the extended period for registration, usually up to three months).
Targeted versus non-targeted The scrapping schemes di¤er in their eligibility criteria. We will distinguish between targeted schemes (red/dark shading in Figure 1 ) and nontargeted schemes (green/light shading). Targeted schemes put conditions on a new vehicle that can be purchased, in terms of maximum CO 2 emissions, engine displacement, or price. For instance, in France cars with CO 2 emissions that do not exceed 160 grams per kilometer were eligible for the scrapping program in 2009. Conversely, non-targeted schemes apply widely to virtually all cars in the country. For instance, in Germany the condition on new cars is rather lax: eligible vehicles have to meet Euro 4 emission standards, which is automatically satis…ed for all cars since the European Commission introduced these standards in 2005. Under some schemes, an old car may be purchased as a replacement car as well (e.g. up to one year old in Germany, or up to eight years old in the Netherlands).
Age The e¤ectiveness of schemes in stimulating car purchases may also di¤er depending on conditions put on the age of a vehicle that can be scrapped (i.e. only vehicles older than a certain age are eligible for the scheme) and, consequently, the age of the existing car ‡eet and its vintage distribution in a country. 13 The lowest minimum age requirement for scrapped cars is 8 years (in Portugal). The highest age requirement is 15 years (e.g. in France in 2008 and in 2011). A higher age threshold for a scrapped car may narrow the base for the scheme and lower its overall success measured by the number of vehicles sold all other things being equal. 14 On the other hand, it may ensure that the most polluting cars are scrapped and thus render higher environmental bene…ts.
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Complexity In general, some European countries have introduced simple transparent scrapping schemes. For instance, in Germany there was one incentive of EUR 2,500 for any type of new car purchased in the form of price discount, which might be clear and appealing to consumers. On the other hand, other countries have approved more complex schemes with a system of subsidies depending on the type of vehicle. For instance, Greek scrapping scheme had a number of conditions that determined the size of incentive (e.g. from EUR 1,500 up to EUR 3,200 for cars) depending on engine displacement, which eventually might make the program less comprehensive to consumers (who cannot correctly assess the associated bene…ts) and, therefore, might limit the scheme's success. Past Spanish scrapping schemes are also perceived to be unsuccessful due to their complex implementation that required the involvement of banks and …nance companies (ACEA (2010)).
Economic assessment of scrapping schemes
Our empirical evaluation of scrapping subsidies largely follows the structure of the ex ante economic compatibility assessment of state aid by the European Commission. This assessment is essentially about striking a balance between the bene…ts and costs of state aid (the so called "balancing test") that we apply to the ex post assessment of scrapping incentives.
16
Incentive e¤ects: demand and environmental e¤ects Scrapping schemes have a general objective of stimulating demand of vehicles to support the automobile industry, especially in the crisis that was accompanied by the worsening of con…dence and degradation of households'access to …nance. Around 60-80% of new European private car purchases are …nanced through some form of credit (IHS Global Insight (2009)).
Since scrapping schemes aim at removing ine¢ cient, high polluting vehicles from circulation and stimulating purchases of more fuel-e¢ cient cars, they have an e¢ ciency objective, in particular with regard to the over-provision of a negative externality such as pollution. The schemes may also be aimed to improve road safety, thus generating a positive externality. However, the environmental and road safety bene…ts of scrapping schemes are somewhat questionable in practice.
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Following these demand and environmental motives to introduce scrapping programs, we can assess their bene…ts, and especially evaluate whether total new car sales and average fuel e¢ ciency of new cars would have been lower absent the schemes, i.e. we can quantify the "incentive e¤ects". The di¤erence in total car sales and average fuel economy with scrapping incentives (actual) and without scrapping incentives (counterfactual) can be viewed as the incentive impact of the scrapping subsidies. Since the actual outcomes are usually observed, a major challenge in practice is to estimate the counterfactual outcomes.
Crowding out e¤ects: temporal and intertemporal substitution Two major types of crowding out e¤ects are relevant in the case of scrapping schemes: temporal substitution, i.e. substitution between cars, and intertemporal substitution.
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As related to the substitution between cars, …rst of all there may be a substitution from non-eligible cars to eligible ones in the case of targeted schemes. That is, during the program period, the sales of eligible cars may go up, whereas the sales of non-eligible cars may go down. For instance, Copeland and Kahn (2012) , Li et al. (2013) report that during the US CARS Program some consumers that would have purchased a car that is not eligible for a scheme have bought a car eligible for the scheme attracted by the availability of a rebate. Finally, there may be a substitution e¤ect between di¤erent types of cars, for example from large to small cars under any type of scheme.
As related to the intertemporal substitution, …rst an anticipatory e¤ect arises when a consumer correctly anticipates the introduction of a scrapping program and delays the purchase of a vehicle that he would have bought anyway. Thus, one can observe a reduction in sales before a scheme starts. Second, scrapping schemes can induce a pull-forward e¤ect, which arises when a scrapping incentive induces sales of vehicles that would otherwise have occurred in the near future: i.e. car sales today at the expense of car sales in the future (European Commission (2009), Cooper et al. (2010) ). A consequence of this e¤ect is that following the expiry of schemes, there is a sharp decrease in sales. The exact timing (a few weeks, a few months or longer), or the dynamic pattern of this e¤ect is di¢ cult to estimate.
Competitive and trade e¤ects Scrapping schemes can cause distortions of competition and trade. First, scrapping schemes can favour car producers that manufacture small sized cars that happen to comply with environmental conditions linked to the incentives or that become more appealing to consumers because the size of incentive makes smaller and cheaper cars more attractive. Consequently, the schemes may distort the market structure in terms of redistributing the market shares of di¤erent …rms or across di¤erent market segments. In such a way, some weaker players in the European car industry may be supported (IHS Global Insight (2010a) ).
Furthermore, scrapping schemes can impact trade ‡ows and distort location decisions. In particular, scrapping schemes can only be attractive for certain models of a car producer. Thus, scrapping programs may result in an uneven plant utilization: some plants may be obliged to allocate workers on short-time working schemes, while other plants may have use overtime to meet the increased demand or shift labour force from one plant to another, as reported by Eurofound (2010) and by carmakers themselves. 19 Finally, if scrapping schemes are de facto selective, they can cause subsidy competitions among countries, where each country designs environmental conditions linked to the incentives (e.g. in terms of CO 2 emissions) to favour domestic producers with respect to foreign ones. Several European countries have imposed environmental requirements on new cars that can be purchased under their schemes. For instance, in France a car is quali…ed for a scrapping bonus if it emits less than 160 grams CO 2 emissions per kilometer (in 2009), or in Italy a new petrol car should emit at most 140 grams CO 2 emissions per kilometer (or 130 grams CO 2 emissions per kilometer in case a diesel car is bought). Similar environmental conditions were set for schemes in Portugal and Spain.
Summary In this paper we aim to investigate the e¤ects of scrapping schemes on total car sales and average fuel economy ("Incentive e¤ects"), explore temporal and intertemporal substitution e¤ects ("Crowding out e¤ects"), quantify the competitive e¤ects of schemes and discuss their trade implications ("Competitive and trade e¤ects"). We especially pay attention to the role of environmental technical eligibility criteria (such as CO 2 emissions, or fuel consumption) for a new car that can be purchased under a scrapping program, and analyze whether the criteria contradict the objective of non-discriminatory nature of scrapping schemes with respect to the origin of a car producer.
3 Empirical approach
Data description
Our …rst dataset is a European car registration dataset from JATO. It covers nine countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Taken together, these countries make up more than 90% of the EU car market. The dataset covers the period between 2005 and 2011. The data are at a high frequency, at a monthly level, and at a very disaggregate level: the individual car model and car variant (engine type, body style, etc.). These data include monthly car registrations, list prices and technical speci…cations (horsepower, various measures of fuel consumption, fuel type, length, width, height, weight, body style, etc.). Although we focus on the e¤ect of the scrapping schemes on car registrations, the information on prices and technical speci…cations is indirectly also very useful: it enables us to determine which cars are eligible in a targeted scrapping scheme and to measure the (relative) size of the scrapping incentive. Finally, there is information on the car's brand, its country of origin, and the …rm ownership.
We slightly aggregate the data and de…ne the unit of our analysis as the combination of model group, body and fuel type, for example the Volkswagen Golf, hatchback, diesel engine. This detailed level enables us to account for various eligibility criteria in the case of targeted schemes, in particular also criteria that are linked to CO 2 emissions and gasoline versus diesel car engines (as in the Netherlands or Italy).
Our second dataset consists of information on the European scrapping programs. For each country and each month, we know whether a scrapping scheme was active. In the case of targeted schemes, we also know which eligibility criteria applied (as summarized above in Table 1 ). We have collected this information from various sources. First of all, the automotive consultancy IHS Global Insight summarizes scrapping schemes for the EU member states in its report to the European Commission, with a speci…c focus on the schemes introduced in response to the last …nancial and economic crisis (IHS Global Insight (2010a) , IHS Global Insight (2010b) ). In addition, the European Automobile Manufacturers'Association (ACEA) gives an overview of scrapping schemes introduced in the EU countries in (ACEA (2010 ). We have cross-checked both major sources of information on scrapping programs with national legislation and government sources for veri…cation and collected missing pieces of information necessary for our empirical analysis.
We combine the car registration data with the information on the European scrapping schemes. We thus obtain a very detailed picture on the scrapping scheme conditions of every car model/fuel engine, in each of the nine countries during each month between 2005 and 2011. More speci…cally, for every model/engine, country and period, we construct a dummy variable indicating whether the model/engine is eligible for a car scrapping scheme. In the case of targeted schemes, this depends on CO 2 emissions criteria, engine displacement, the price or other criteria. Furthermore, we construct a variable for the size of the incentive (which may also depend on the criteria in the case of targeted schemes) and some additional information, such as the minimum age of a car that can be scrapped (country/month speci…c information).
We set the duration of a scrapping scheme to be equal to its o¢ cial duration according to a respective regulation or legislative act. We also allow for an extended period to register a car as part of our sensitivity analysis. The extended period usually takes up to three months after the o¢ cial expiry date of schemes and captures the time gap between sale and registration of a car. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables in 2009 (when all countries in our sample, except for Belgium, introduced scrapping programs, although during di¤erent months). We distinguish between countries with targeted schemes (left hand side) and countries with non-targeted schemes (right hand side). In the case of targeted schemes, we also distinguish between eligible cars and non-eligible cars. For targeted schemes, the eligible cars form a minority (9,764 model observations versus 15,656 observations for the non-eligible models), but they have on average much higher sales (400 versus 58 cars). The eligible cars also tend to be sold at a much lower price (average of EUR 19,400 versus EUR 44,700 for the non-eligible models), and, by construction, they are much more fuel-e¢ cient. For countries with non-targeted schemes, the summary statistics typically fall in between these extremes. For example, the average price in countries with non-targeted schemes is EUR 34,813. The average relative incentives are 8.3% for eligible cars in the case of targeted schemes and 6.0% across all cars in the case of non-targeted schemes. Figure 2 (see Appendix) depicts the evolution of seasonally adjusted monthly car sales in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These were the countries that introduced the scrapping programs for the …rst time between 2005 and 2011, in response to the …nancial crisis. In all countries sales declined in the second half of 2008 in response to the worsening …nancial and macroeconomic conditions. The scrapping programs could have helped to stabilize the car sales and prevented them from a sharper decline. Especially the German scrapping scheme seems to have caused a spike in the car sales during the treatment period of scrapping subsidy, followed by a noticeable decline afterward. In general, however, it is di¢ cult to draw clear conclusions from the Figure, since there are many factors that may have a¤ected sales before and after the treatment period. Our empirical framework below aims to disentangle the various e¤ects and obtain conclusive evidence on the e¤ects of programs.
We have extended our European car scrapping database with macroeconomic data on European countries in our sample: GDP per capita (Eurostat, quarterly), unemployment rate (Eurostat, monthly), consumer con…dence index (OECD, monthly), price of fuel/diesel (OECD, quarterly) and total number of passenger cars in use, or number of passenger cars in use more than 10 years old (Eurostat, yearly).
Identi…cation and estimation strategy
To identify the e¤ects of the car scrapping subsidies, we employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach. The idea is to compare the change in sales in the treatment countries, where the scrapping policies took place during certain time periods, with the change in sales in the control countries, where the scrapping policies did not take place (e.g. Belgium), or took place during di¤erent time periods. Our identi…cation strategy thus exploits a unique feature of the European scrapping programs, i.e. that they were implemented at di¤erent time intervals during the 2005-2011 period, as shown earlier in Figure 1 . We can follow this approach because we have detailed information on sales by car model for many European countries at a high, monthly frequency.
A simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach would consider one treatment and one control group, and only two time periods. The identifying assumption in such a setting is that the treatment and control groups follow the same trend in the absence of the treatment (scrapping program). We can extend this assumption to multiple countries and multiple time periods. We will control for macro-economic variables that may evolve di¤erently across countries, such as monthly GDP and fuel prices. We will also control for other policies that were implemented during the period: the green incentives implemented in Belgium during 2008-2011 ("eco-incentives"in the form of price reductions of up to 15%) and France during 2008-2011 ("bonus-malus"in the form of a staggered tax rebate of up to EUR 5,000 for cars with low CO 2 emissions and an extra charge of up to EUR 2,600 for cars with high CO 2 emissions).
Since we observe the sales and car speci…cations at the level of individual car models, we can further enrich the framework in various ways. First, we can account for the size of the scrapping policy incentive, which may di¤er depending on the car speci…cations. Second, we can account for various possible crowding out e¤ects of the scrapping schemes. In the case of targeted scrapping schemes, we can assess the di¤erential e¤ects on the eligible cars (usually with low CO 2 emissions) and non-eligible cars (with high CO 2 emissions). We can also assess the intertemporal e¤ects: anticipatory and pull-forward e¤ects. Third, we can consider the e¤ects of the scrapping schemes on competition and trade. Perhaps the most relevant question from a European policy perspective is whether domestic brands bene…t more from scrapping subsidies than foreign brands. We can also compare di¤erent e¤ects between volume and premium brands, or across market segments.
Incentive e¤ects With multiple countries and time periods, one can implement the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach using a panel …xed e¤ects estimator. We include a full set of model/country …xed e¤ects, and monthly time …xed e¤ects, as well as various control variables that may vary over models/countries/time periods. One may start from the following basic speci…cation, which focuses entirely on the incentive e¤ects of the scrapping subsidies: log(sales jct ) = jc + t + scrap jct +x jct + w ct + " jct ;
where j is the car model (i.e. model group/body type/fuel type, as de…ned above), c is the country, and t is time period (month during [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] 
This takes into account the fact that size of the schemes may di¤er across models, and vary across countries and time periods. The parameter measures how sales change after the scrapping policy in the treatment country, compared with the change in sales in the control countries. When we use the dummy variable scrap jct , is the percentage sales increase, regardless of the size of the scheme. When we instead use the percentage monetary incentive variable scrap_pct jct , is the elasticity of the incentive, i.e. the percentage sales increase when the monetary incentive increases by 1 percent.
The other terms in (1) and in (2) control for other, model-and/or country-speci…c factors that may vary over time. The vector x jct includes car characteristics that may vary over time and between countries (horsepower, displacement, fuel economy, width and height). The vector w ct includes various country-speci…c macro-economic variables that may vary over time, namely income per capita, unemployment, a consumer con…dence index and fuel prices. It also includes country speci…c seasonal e¤ects (monthly dummy variables per country). Finally, " jct is an error term. We account for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, and use clustered standard errors as emphasized by Bertrand et al. (2004) in the di¤erence-in-di¤erences context.
We now extend this basic framework to account for various possible crowding out as well as competitive and trade e¤ects.
Crowding out e¤ects Speci…cations (1) and (2) do not distinguish between targeted and non-targeted schemes. The treatment group thus includes all cars in countries where non-targeted schemes are active, and it includes all eligible cars in countries with targeted schemes. The control group includes all cars in countries where no scheme is active, but it also includes the non-eligible cars in countries where a targeted scheme is active (see Table  2 ). This speci…cation may be restrictive for targeted schemes if there are substitution e¤ects: it is possible that the eligible cars gain proportionately more, and that the non-eligible cars actually lose sales (rather than being una¤ected). To allow for the possible di¤erential impact of targeted and non-targeted schemes, we extend (1) to the following speci…cation:
The variable NT ct is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country c at time period t adopted a non-targeted scheme, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the variable T ct is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country c at time period t adopted a targeted scheme. The parameter 1 then measures the sales e¤ect of a non-targeted scrapping scheme on all cars in the country. Similarly, 2 measures the sales e¤ect of a targeted scheme on the eligible cars (which satisfy the CO 2 or other stipulated criteria). Finally, 3 measures the sales e¤ect of a targeted scheme on the non-eligible cars (which do not satisfy the eligibility criteria). One may expect that 2 > 1 > 0 1 3 , i.e. eligible cars bene…t more under targeted than all cars under nontargeted schemes, and non-eligible cars under targeted schemes lose if there is a substitution e¤ect to eligible cars.
Speci…cation (3) is based on the dummy variable scrap jct , which considers the e¤ect of the scrapping scheme regardless of the size of the incentive. We also consider a speci…cation that is based on the percentage monetary incentive variable scrap_pct jct :
This speci…cation takes into account the size of the monetary incentive. We consider (3) and (4) as our base speci…cations: they account for the incentive e¤ects of the scrapping schemes ( 1 and 2 ) and a main potential crowding out e¤ect under targeted schemes: the between-car substitution e¤ect from non-eligible to eligible cars ( 3 ). The between-car substitution e¤ect is a crowding out e¤ect that may happen during the scheme. We also extend (3) and (4) to consider intertemporal crowding out e¤ects, which may occur before or after the scheme. First, we consider before-subsidy anticipatory e¤ects. If the scheme is announced some time before it comes into force, consumers may delay their car purchases to bene…t from the program. One may then observe a drop in car sales before the program. To consider this e¤ect, we include a dummy variable in (3) and (4) for the …rst month of the scheme (when it may not yet have been e¤ective). 20 Second, we consider post-subsidy pull-forward e¤ects. Consumers may decide to purchase a car during the scheme for a planned purchase after the scheme. Consequently, following the expiry of schemes, the car sales may go down. To investigate this e¤ect, we introduce a dummy variable for the …rst three months after a scheme expires. Note that the post-scheme e¤ect may also capture the extended period for car registrations, during which the sales e¤ect due to the scrapping subsidies may still be high.
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Competitive and trade e¤ects Speci…cations (3) and (4) assume the e¤ects of the scrapping schemes are homogeneous across car models. In practice, the scrapping schemes may have di¤erential e¤ects, so that some cars obtain a competitive advantage. We focus here on the possible di¤erential e¤ects between domestic and foreign cars, but in our empirical analysis we also consider the di¤erential e¤ects between volume and premium brands, and between di¤erent car segments. We limit attention to the speci…cation that is based on the percentage monetary incentive. To di¤erentiate between the e¤ects of the scrapping schemes on the sales of domestic and foreign cars, we consider the following generalization of (4):
where DOM jct is a dummy variable equal to one if a car model j is produced by a domestic car producer in country c at period t. We de…ne the model's domestic/foreign status based on the parent …rm's nationality. We also use a variant of speci…cation (5), to see whether there are di¤erent e¤ects of the scrapping programs on volume and premium car brands. Premium brands include cars produced by Audi, BMW, Mercedes, and some small luxury brands. Finally, we investigate whether the e¤ects of scrapping schemes di¤er across market segments. This will allow us to infer about the e¤ect of schemes on the purchases of small, usually more fuel-e¢ cient, and large, usually less fuel-e¢ cient, cars.
Empirical …ndings
We now present our empirical …ndings on the e¤ects of the scrapping schemes. We begin with the basic framework where we consider the incentive and crowding out e¤ects. We then extend the analysis to consider competitive and trade e¤ects, i.e. di¤erential e¤ects of the scrapping schemes across di¤erent models. Table 3 reports the results. Columns (1) and (4) are based on speci…cations (1) and (2). These assume that the scrapping schemes have the same e¤ect on all cars, without distinguishing between targeted and non-targeted schemes. Column (1) is based on the dummy variable scrap jct , so it measures the e¤ect of the scrapping scheme regardless of the size of the incentive. This shows that the sales e¤ect of scrapping schemes is positive and statistically signi…cant: the coe¢ cient of 0.114 implies that sales go up on average by 12.1% due to the scheme.
Incentive and crowding out e¤ects
22 Column (4) is based on the percentage subsidy variable scrap_pct jct , so it considers the e¤ect of a percentage scrapping subsidy. The e¤ect of a percentage increase in the scrapping subsidy is also positive and statistically signi…cant: a 1% increase in the scrapping subsidy raises car sales by 1.8%. Columns (2) and (5) are based on speci…cations (3) and (4). These take into account that the scrapping schemes have a di¤erential e¤ect for targeted and non-targeted schemes, and also consider the crowding out e¤ect on non-eligible cars in the case of targeted schemes. Column (2), based on the dummy variable scrap jct , shows that the average e¤ect of scrapping schemes on sales is large when the schemes are targeted, i.e. a coe¢ cient of 0.260 or an average 29.7% increase in the sales of eligible cars. The cars not eligible for purchase under targeted schemes do not su¤er from the scrapping subsidies (i.e. no crowding out). Column (5), which is based on the percentage subsidy variable, yields positive sales e¤ects in the case of both types of schemes. The e¤ect of the percentage subsidy is however stronger under targeted than under non-targeted schemes: a 1% increase in the subsidy raises sales of targeted cars by 2.8% whereas under non-targeted schemes a 1% increase in the subsidy raises sales of all cars by 1.4%. As before, we do not …nd any signi…cant crowding out e¤ect. The table reports the parameter estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis). Column (1) refers to speci…cation (1), columns (2) and (3) refer to speci…cation (3); column (4) refers to speci…cation (2), and columns (5) and (6) refer to speci…cation (4). The dependent variable is the logarithm of car model sales. Car characteristics, country-speci…c model, country-speci…c monthly (for seasonal adjustment), and year-monthly …xed e¤ects as well as macroeconomic controls (income per capita, unemployment, consumer con…dence, and fuel prices) and dummies (or respectively, relative size) for green rebates in Belgium and France are included but not reported. ' 'means that we use either a dummy for scrapping policy in the left hand side of the table (speci…cations (1) and (3)), or a percentage monetary incentive in the right hand side of the table (speci…cations (2) and (4)).
The results in columns (2) and (5) thus show that the targeted programs do not cause any 21 crowding out because of a substitution e¤ect: they do not tend to increase sales of eligible cars at the expense of the sales of non-eligible cars. The substitution e¤ect is a crowding out e¤ect during the scheme. We now extend the analysis to account for possible intertemporal crowding out e¤ects. We investigate two types of intertemporal e¤ects: anticipatory (before-subsidy) and pullforward (after-subsidy). To estimate possible anticipatory e¤ects of the scrapping schemes, we include a dummy for the …rst month of the scheme. To estimate whether there are any pull-forward e¤ects of the scrapping schemes we include a dummy for three months after a scheme expires. We do not di¤erentiate the anticipatory e¤ect between targeted and non-targeted schemes as well as between eligible and non-eligible cars. Speci…c details of schemes are not known a priori, so that a consumer most plausibly does not know which type of a car is exactly eligible for a scheme before the scheme is actually approved, and the o¢ cial decision is published and the scheme comes into e¤ect. However, we di¤erentiate the pull-forward e¤ects between targeted and non-targeted schemes, and in the case of targeted schemes between eligible and non-eligible cars.
Columns (3) and (6) of Table 3 show the results. The scrapping e¤ects during the scheme change only slightly compared with the previous speci…cations that do not include anticipatory and pull-forward e¤ects. As related to the anticipatory e¤ects, the e¤ect of the dummy variable for the …rst month of the scheme is negative and signi…cant. This shows that the …rst month of the scheme is not yet part of the treatment period of the scrapping scheme, which stems from the lag between car purchase orders and car registrations. Hence, there is a negative anticipatory e¤ect, but the e¤ect is only one month, and its magnitude is relatively small, equivalent to about one third of the monthly e¤ect during the scheme.
As related to the pull-forward e¤ects, the e¤ect of post-subsidy dummy variable is negative and statistically signi…cant in the case of non-targeted schemes and for non-eligible cars in the case of targeted schemes. The e¤ect on the sales of eligible cars in the case of targeted schemes is positive and statistically signi…cant, which might be explained by the extended period for car registrations. In this case, although the schemes expire, their positive e¤ect can be felt over a longer period of time. Note that we do not observe any post-subsidy period in the case of French targeted scheme. The longer than three months'post-scheme period may also be contaminated by other in ‡uences (see for instance Mian and Su… (2012) for related discussion).
We have performed some counterfactuals to quantify the impact of scrapping schemes on total car sales and average fuel economy of new cars (see Table 4 ). We …nd that European car sales (in countries with scrapping policies) would have been 15.9% lower in 2009 absent the schemes. The sales would have been 17.4% lower in countries with targeted schemes (and 21.1% for the eligible cars). Sales would have been 14.8% lower in countries with non-targeted schemes. Although scrapping policies thus stabilized sales in all countries, their individual performance varies. For instance, in Germany, with its non-targeted scheme, around 640 thousand cars (or 17.6% of total German car sales in 2009) would not have been purchased without the scheme. In Germany, around 1.6 million cars were sold with a scrapping incentive. That is, 40.8% of cars purchased with a scrapping subsidy, were such that otherwise would not have been purchased. In France, with a targeted scheme, 15.9% of cars would not have been purchased absent the subsidy in 2009.
We have also investigated how the schemes a¤ected the sales-weighted average fuel consumption of new cars. We …nd a bene…cial but small environmental impact because consumers substitute to more fuel e¢ cient cars in response to the schemes. In countries with non-targeted schemes, average fuel consumption would have been only 0.5% higher in the absence of the schemes; in countries with targeted schemes that were explicitly targeted to low emission vehicles, average fuel consumption would have been 1.3% higher without the schemes, which is still only a modest e¤ect compared with the large total sales impact of the schemes. 23 The e¤ects are also quite heterogenous across countries. The targeted scheme improved average fuel economy by up 2.3% in Spain. In contrast, the targeted scheme in France improved average fuel economy by 0.6%, which is the same as in Germany which had a non-targeted scheme. To sum up, we …nd a considerable impact of the scrapping schemes on total car sales. In contrast, environmental bene…ts are very small as the average fuel economy of purchased new cars improves only little. Consequently, the main impact of scrapping schemes is on the total sales. There is no evidence for crowding out through the substitution e¤ect between eligible and non-eligible cars during the targeted schemes, although we …nd some evidence for small intertemporal substitution e¤ects. 24 24 Our considerable sales impact of the scrapping schemes seems to be in line with the recent estimates of the sales e¤ect of scrapping schemes introduced in response to the …nancial crisis, found in other studies. For instance, Mian and Su… (2012) …nd that about half of the vehicles that were purchased under the US CARS Program were such that would otherwise not have been purchased. The US studies …nd however higher intertemporal e¤ects, which makes the overall performance of the program rather bleak. The car sales decreased in the months before and especially after the program (Copeland and Kahn (2012) , Mian and Su… (2012) , Li et al. (2013) ). There is also some evidence on the sales e¤ects of scrapping schemes
Competitive and trade e¤ects We now extend the framework to consider the competitive e¤ects of the scrapping schemes, i.e. the di¤erential impact of scrapping schemes between domestic and foreign car producers, between premium and volume brands, and between the various market segments. As discussed above, we limit attention to the speci…cation where the scrapping scheme is measured as a percentage subsidy. Table 5 reports the results. Column (1) follows speci…cation (5), and considers whether scrapping programs have a di¤erent sales e¤ect on domestic and foreign …rms. This enables us to assess whether the scrapping schemes are designed to support domestic car production, especially so-called "national champions". Interestingly, the non-targeted schemes have a stronger impact on domestic than on foreign brands: a 1 percent non-targeted subsidy raises sales of foreign brands by 1.2%, and it raises the sales of domestic brands by an additional 1.5%. Hence, the non-targeted schemes (introduced in important car-producing countries Germany and the United Kingdom) may still protect domestic manufacturers, even though they were designed very broadly and without any restrictive eligibility conditions. This may be due to some unobserved characteristics of the schemes.
in the past. For instance, Licandro and Sampayo (2005) quantify a transitory increase of 16% in car sales following the introduction of 1997 Spanish scrapping subsidy and a permanent increase of about 1.2% in car sales in the long run. Schiraldi (2011) …nds that the Italian "cash-for-replacement" schemes increased sales by 97% in 1997 and by 51% in 1998. Adda and Cooper (2000) also report the bursts in car sales following the introduction of French scrapping subsidies in 1994 and 1996. The table reports the parameter estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) for speci…cation (5). The dependent variable is the logarithm of car model sales. Car characteristics, country-speci…c model, country-speci…c monthly (for seasonal adjustment), and year-monthly …xed e¤ects as well as macroeconomic controls (income per capita, unemployment, consumer con…dence, and fuel prices) and dummies (or respectively, relative size) for green rebates in Belgium and France are included but not reported. 'X'stands for "DOM"(domestic brand dummy) in (1), and for "PREMIUM" (premium brand dummy) in (2).
In contrast, the targeted schemes do not have a di¤erential impact on domestic and foreign car brands. Hence, domestic brands do not receive any extra stimulus under targeted schemes, but they may of course bene…t more if they are more likely to fall under the eligibility criteria, set by the governments. To assess this, we computed the overall e¤ects of targeted schemes on total domestic and foreign sales. The major car-producing countries with targeted schemes are France, Italy and Spain. We …nd that domestic …rms do not bene…t more than foreign …rms.
In particular, our counterfactuals (Table 6) show that total sales of domestic cars would have been 25.2% lower without non-targeted schemes, whereas total sales of foreign cars would have been only 13.6% lower. Therefore, non-targeted schemes have a larger stimulating e¤ect on domestic car purchases. For instance, in the United Kingdom sales of domestic cars would have been 20.4% lower absent the program, and only 12.2% lower for foreign cars. In contrast, in the case of targeted schemes, sales of domestic cars would have been 14.4% lower absent the schemes, and 17.0% lower for foreign cars. Therefore, both domestic and foreign brands bene…ted from the targeted schemes. For instance, in France foreign brands could have bene…ted only slightly more than domestic brands through scrapping incentives: sales of domestic cars would have been 13.0% lower absent the subsidies, whereas sales of foreign cars would have been 15.4% lower. Scrapping schemes can thus have adverse e¤ects on competition since they might bene…t domestic car producers, but only indirectly in the case of non-targeted schemes. The environmental eligibility criteria in the case of targeted schemes, contrary to a priori expectations, may however not involve any serious competitive concerns.
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Because of the di¤erential impact on domestic and foreign car sales, scrapping schemes may exercise not only competitive e¤ects, but also a¤ect trade ‡ows. The increased demand for foreign car brands, not produced locally, or the increased demand for domestic car brands that cannot be satis…ed based on the existing country's capacities, can have an e¤ect on trade ‡ows. For instance, they may stimulate higher imports to meet the country's internal demand, and/or increase exports to meet the increased demand abroad. There is some evidence that car imports increased into Germany during the 2009 scrapping scheme because most small and economical cars are either produced by foreign car producers, or they are not manufactured in Germany (IHS Global Insight (2010b) ). Especially Korean, French and Italian car makers could pro…t from this trend.
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Column (2) of Table 5 follows a variant of speci…cation (5), and considers whether the scrapping programs have a di¤erent e¤ect on volume and premium producers. We …nd evidence for a lower stimulus e¤ect on premium cars in the case of targeted scrapping programs: a 1 percent targeted subsidy raises demand by 2.9% for volume brands and by only 1.0% for premium brands. Since there are no environmental eligibility conditions in the case of nontargeted schemes (these conditions could target in particular smaller and more fuel-e¢ cient cars that usually volume car manufacturers produce), both premium and volume brands can pro…t from the scrapping subsidies. Recall that our premium brand de…nition includes Audi, BMW, Mercedes and some small luxury car brands (for instance, Bentley, Cadillac). Audi, BMW and Mercedes are distinguished German premium car brands, and the German scheme was designed very broadly, most probably so that these premium car producers could have a chance to bene…t from the scheme as well. Our counterfactuals also con…rm that both premium and volume car brands bene…ted from the scrapping subsidies, however premium brands pro…ted to a much lower extent.
Finally, we investigate the e¤ects of scrapping schemes on sales across market segments. As we can see in Table 7 , subcompact and compact cars bene…ted both in the case of targeted and non-targeted schemes. There is no e¤ect on the sales of cars belonging to the intermediate market segment. Standard, luxury and sports cars bene…t only in the case of targeted schemes, while SUVs might bene…t only in the case of non-targeted schemes. Compact vans and MPVs pro…t also in the case of both targeted and non-targeted schemes, but the e¤ect under the targeted programs is larger. Most probably, large cars can still pro…t from the targeted schemes if they meet the program eligibility criteria, despite a price disadvantage compared to small lower-priced cars. For our purpose, we have collected a unique model-level monthly dataset on the European car market and scrapping schemes. We apply a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, with …xed e¤ects in a panel data context, and exploit variation of scrapping programs at country level to identify the impact of scrapping programs on car sales. The country di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is well-suited in our context: various European countries have introduced or phased out their scrapping subsidies at di¤erent points in time, or some countries have not introduced any scrapping scheme at all. This estimation strategy can help us to alleviate the potential endogeneity problem that may be characteristic for time-series country-speci…c studies on scrapping policy evaluation (i.e. both sales and scrapping schemes may be driven by some third variable, e.g. worsening macroeconomic conditions).
As related to the "incentive and crowding-out e¤ects", we found that scrapping schemes have substantially stimulated car purchases. This prevented a large decline in sales in 2009 due to the last economic downturn. Targeted schemes had stronger e¤ects on car sales than non-targeted schemes, especially on the sales of eligible cars. Targeted schemes did not cause any substitution between di¤erent types of cars: eligible cars do not bene…t at the expense of non-eligible cars. In contrast, the environmental bene…ts of the scrapping schemes were very modest, in the sense that they improved the average fuel economy of new cars to a low extent. In sum, the scrapping schemes that were introduced in response to the crisis can be viewed as a short-term instrument to stabilize car demand and thus to counteract the …nancial crisis and economic downturn, but not as a long-term instrument to generate environmental bene…ts.
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As related to "competitive and trade e¤ects", we found that the "green"eligibility criteria in the case of targeted schemes (e.g. in the form of CO 2 emissions) did not cause any serious competitive bias. Although the primary objective of these criteria may be to protect "national champions", foreign competitors could bene…t from the schemes as well, and domestic cars did not gain more than foreign brands. In contrast, non-targeted schemes stimulated higher purchases of domestic car brands. Furthermore, premium car brands still gained from the targeted scrapping subsidies, although to a lesser extent than volume brands. They did no face any extra disadvantage from being a premium brand in the case of non-targeted schemes. Consumers can still buy premium cars if they are attractive to them because of a price advantage due to the …xed scrapping premium. Finally, scrapping subsidies had dif-ferent sales e¤ects across market segments, and not only small but also large cars bene…ted from the scrapping programs.
In general, our empirical analysis and …ndings …t well into the economic framework that we have implemented to assess scrapping subsidies, following the so called "balancing test" of positive and negative e¤ects applied by the European Commission in the case of state aid. In European state aid terms, scrapping schemes are a public support instrument that does not constitute state aid if the schemes are non-discriminatory, i.e. open to all undertakings or fall under the de minimis regulation. Hence, they are not subject to the noti…cation requirement and the economic assessment by the European Commission. Our …ndings generally support, contrary to a priori expectations, the presumed ex ante nondiscriminatory nature of scrapping schemes. Our ex post evaluation of European scrapping schemes in the …nancial crisis has been very informative in this respect, and the Commission can pursue such evaluations in the future to guide its public support policy.
